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Abstract. In this paper we considered the extension of the First-order Logic
(FOL) by Bealer’s intensional abstraction operator. Contemporary use of the term
’intension’ derives from the traditional logical Frege-Russell’s doctrine that an
idea (logic formula) has both an extension and an intension. Although there is
divergence in formulation, it is accepted that the extension of an idea consists of
the subjects to which the idea applies, and the intension consists of the attributes
implied by the idea. From the Montague’s point of view, the meaning of an idea
can be considered as particular extensions in different possible worlds.
In the case of the pure FOL we obtain commutative homomorphic diagram that
holds in each given possible world of the intensional FOL, from the free algebra
of the FOL syntax, toward its intensional algebra of concepts, and, successively,
to the new extensional relational algebra (different from Cylindric algebras). Then
we show that it corresponds to the Tarski’s interpretation of the standard exten-
sional FOL in this possible world.
1 Introduction
In ”U¨ber Sinn und Bedeutung”, Frege concentrated mostly on the senses of names,
holding that all names have a sense. It is natural to hold that the same considerations
apply to any expression that has an extension. Two general terms can have the same
extension and different cognitive significance; two predicates can have the same ex-
tension and different cognitive significance; two sentences can have the same extension
and different cognitive significance. So general terms, predicates, and sentences all have
senses as well as extensions. The same goes for any expression that has an extension,
or is a candidate for extension.
The simplest aspect of an expression’s meaning is its extension. We can stipulate that
the extension of a sentence is its truth-value, and that the extension of a singular term
is its referent. The extension of other expressions can be seen as associated entities that
contribute to the truth-value of a sentence in a manner broadly analogous to the way
in which the referent of a singular term contributes to the truth-value of a sentence. In
many cases, the extension of an expression will be what we intuitively think of as its ref-
erent, although this need not hold in all cases, as the case of sentences illustrates. While
Frege himself is often interpreted as holding that a sentence’s referent is its truth-value,
this claim is counterintuitive and widely disputed. We can avoid that issue in the present
framework by using the technical term ’extension’. In this context, the claim that the
extension of a sentence is its truth-value is a stipulation.
’Extensional’ is most definitely a technical term. Say that the extension of a name is its
denotation, the extension of a predicate is the set of things it applies to, and the exten-
sion of a sentence is its truth value. A logic is extensional if coextensional expressions
can be substituted one for another in any sentence of the logic ”salva veritate”, that is,
without a change in truth value. The intuitive idea behind this principle is that, in an
extensional logic, the only logically significant notion of meaning that attaches to an
expression is its extension. An intensional logics is exactly one in which substitutivity
salva veritate fails for some of the sentences of the logic.
The first conception of intensional entities (or concepts) is built into the possible-worlds
treatment of Properties, Relations and Propositions (PRP)s. This conception is com-
monly attributed to Leibniz, and underlies Alonzo Church’s alternative formulation of
Frege’s theory of senses (”A formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation” in
Henle, Kallen, and Langer, 3-24, and ”Outline of a Revised Formulation of the Logic
of Sense and Denotation” in two parts, Nous,VII (1973), 24-33, and VIII,(1974),135-
156). This conception of PRPs is ideally suited for treating the modalities (necessity,
possibility, etc..) and to Montague’s definition of intension of a given virtual predicate
φ(x1, ..., xk) (a FOL open-sentence with the tuple of free variables (x1, ...xk)) as a
mapping from possible worlds into extensions of this virtual predicate. Among the pos-
sible worlds we distinguish the actual possible world. For example if we consider a set
of predicates of a given Database and their extensions in different time-instances, the
actual possible world is identified by the current instance of the time.
The second conception of intensional entities is to be found in in Russell’s doctrine of
logical atomism. On this doctrine it is required that all complete definitions of inten-
sional entities be finite as well as unique and non-circular: it offers an algebraic way
for definition of complex intensional entities from simple (atomic) entities (i.e., alge-
bra of concepts), conception also evident in Leibniz’s remarks. In a predicate logics,
predicates and open-sentences (with free variables) expresses classes (properties and
relations), and sentences express propositions. Note that classes (intensional entities)
are reified, i.e., they belong to the same domain as individual objects (particulars). This
endows the intensional logics with a great deal of uniformity, making it possible to ma-
nipulate classes and individual objects in the same language. In particular, when viewed
as an individual object, a class can be a member of another class.
The distinction between intensions and extensions is important, considering that ex-
tensions can be notoriously difficult to handle in an efficient manner. The extensional
equality theory of predicates and functions under higher-order semantics (for example,
for two predicates with the same set of attributes p = q is true iff these symbols are in-
terpreted by the same relation), that is, the strong equational theory of intensions, is not
decidable, in general. For example, in the second-order predicate calculus and Church’s
simple theory of types, both under the standard semantics, is not even semi-decidable.
Thus, separating intensions from extensions makes it possible to have an equational the-
ory over predicate and function names (intensions) that is separate from the extensional
equality of relations and functions.
In what follows we denote by BA the set of all functions from A to B, and by An a
n-folded cartesian product A × ... × A for n ≥ 1. By f, t we denote empty set ∅ and
singleton set {<>} respectively (with the empty tuple <> i.e. the unique tuple of 0-ary
relation), which may be thought of as falsity f and truth t, as those used in the rela-
tional algebra. For a given domainD we define thatD0 is a singleton set {<>}, so that
{f, t} = P(D0), where P is the powerset operator.
2 Intensional FOL language with intensional abstraction
Intensional entities are such concepts as propositions and properties. What make them
’intensional’ is that they violate the principle of extensionality; the principle that exten-
sional equivalence implies identity. All (or most) of these intensional entities have been
classified at one time or another as kinds of Universals [1].
We consider a non empty domain D = D−1
⋃
DI , where a subdomain D−1 is made
of particulars (extensional entities), and the rest DI = D0
⋃
D1...
⋃
Dn... is made of
universals (D0 for propositions (the 0-ary concepts), andDn, n ≥ 1, for n-ary concepts.
The fundamental entities are intensional abstracts or so called, ’that’-clauses. We as-
sume that they are singular terms; Intensional expressions like ’believe’, mean’, ’assert’,
’know’, are standard two-place predicates that take ’that’-clauses as arguments. Expres-
sions like ’is necessary’, ’is true’, and ’is possible’ are one-place predicates that take
’that’-clauses as arguments. For example, in the intensional sentence ”it is necessary
that φ”, where φ is a proposition, the ’that φ’ is denoted by the ⋖φ⋗, where ⋖⋗ is the
intensional abstraction operator which transforms a logic formula into a term. Or, for
example, ”x believes that φ” is given by formula p2i (x,⋖φ⋗) ( p2i is binary ’believe’
predicate).
Here we will present an intensional FOL with slightly different intensional abstraction
than that originally presented in [2]:
Definition 1. The syntax of the First-order Logic language with intensional abstraction
⋖⋗, denoted by Ł, is as follows:
Logic operators (∧,¬, ∃); Predicate letters in P (functional letters are considered as
particular case of predicate letters); Variables x, y, z, .. in V; Abstraction ⋖ ⋗, and
punctuation symbols (comma, parenthesis). With the following simultaneous inductive
definition of term and formula :
1. All variables and constants (0-ary functional letters in P) are terms.
2. If t1, ..., tk are terms, then pki (t1, ..., tk) is a formula (pki ∈ P is a k-ary predicate
letter).
3. If φ and ψ are formulae, then (φ ∧ ψ), ¬φ, and (∃x)φ are formulae.
4. If φ(x) is a formula (virtual predicate) with a list of free variables in x = (x1, ..., xn)
(with ordering from-left-to-right of their appearance in φ), and α is its sublist of dis-
tinct variables, then ⋖φ⋗βα is a term, where β is the remaining list of free variables
preserving ordering in x as well. The externally quantifiable variables are the free vari-
ables not in α. When n = 0, ⋖φ⋗ is a term which denotes a proposition, for n ≥ 1 it
denotes a n-ary concept.
An occurrence of a variable xi in a formula (or a term) is bound (free) iff it lies (does
not lie) within a formula of the form (∃xi)φ (or a term of the form⋖φ⋗βα with xi ∈ α).
A variable is free (bound) in a formula (or term) iff it has (does not have) a free occur-
rence in that formula (or term).
A sentence is a formula having no free variables. The binary predicate letter p21 for
identity is singled out as a distinguished logical predicate and formulae of the form
p21(t1, t2) are to be rewritten in the form t1 .= t2. We denote by R= the binary relation
obtained by standard Tarski’s interpretation of this predicate p21. The logic operators
∀,∨,⇒ are defined in terms of (∧,¬, ∃) in the usual way.
The universal quantifier is defined by ∀ = ¬∃¬. Disjunction and implication are ex-
pressed by φ∨ψ = ¬(¬φ∧¬ψ), and φ⇒ ψ = ¬φ∨ψ. In FOL with the identity .=, the
formula (∃1x)φ(x) denotes the formula (∃x)φ(x)∧(∀x)(∀y)(φ(x)∧φ(y) ⇒ (x
.
= y)).
We denote by R= the Tarski’s interpretation of
.
=.
In what follows any open-sentence, a formula φ with non empty tuple of free variables
(x1, ..., xm), will be called a m-ary virtual predicate, denoted also by φ(x1, ..., xm).
This definition contains the precise method of establishing the ordering of variables in
this tuple: such an method that will be adopted here is the ordering of appearance, from
left to right, of free variables in φ. This method of composing the tuple of free variables
is the unique and canonical way of definition of the virtual predicate from a given for-
mula.
The intensional interpretation of this intensional FOL is a mapping between the set Ł
of formulae of the logic language and intensional entities in D, I : Ł → D, is a kind of
”conceptualization”, such that an open-sentence (virtual predicate) φ(x1, ..., xk) with a
tuple of all free variables (x1, ..., xk) is mapped into a k-ary concept, that is, an inten-
sional entity u = I(φ(x1, ..., xk)) ∈ Dk, and (closed) sentence ψ into a proposition
(i.e., logic concept) v = I(ψ) ∈ D0 with I(⊤) = Truth ∈ D0 for the FOL tautology
⊤. A language constant c is mapped into a particular a = I(c) ∈ D−1 if it is a proper
name, otherwise in a correspondent concept in D.
An assignment g : V → D for variables in V is applied only to free variables in terms
and formulae. Such an assignment g ∈ DV can be recursively uniquely extended into
the assignment g∗ : T → D, where T denotes the set of all terms (here I is an inten-
sional interpretation of this FOL, as explained in what follows), by :
1. g∗(t) = g(x) ∈ D if the term t is a variable x ∈ V .
2. g∗(t) = I(c) ∈ D if the term t is a constant c ∈ P .
3. if t is an abstracted term ⋖φ⋗βα, then g∗(⋖φ⋗βα) = I(φ[β/g(β)]) ∈ Dk, k = |α|
(i.e., the number of variables in α), where g(β) = g(y1, .., ym) = (g(y1), ..., g(ym))
and [β/g(β)] is a uniform replacement of each i-th variable in the list β with the i-th
constant in the list g(β). Notice that α is the list of all free variables in the formula
φ[β/g(β)].
We denote by t/g (or φ/g) the ground term (or formula) without free variables, ob-
tained by assignment g from a term t (or a formula φ), and by φ[x/t] the formula
obtained by uniformly replacing x by a term t in φ.
The distinction between intensions and extensions is important especially because we
are now able to have and equational theory over intensional entities (as ⋖φ⋗), that
is predicate and function ”names”, that is separate from the extensional equality of
relations and functions. An extensionalization function h assigns to the intensional
elements of D an appropriate extension as follows: for each proposition u ∈ D0,
h(u) ∈ {f, t} ⊆ P(D−1) is its extension (true or false value); for each n-ary con-
cept u ∈ Dn, h(u) is a subset of Dn (n-th Cartesian product of D); in the case of
particulars u ∈ D−1, h(u) = u.
The sets f, t are empty set {} and set {<>} (with the empty tuple <>∈ D−1 i.e. the
unique tuple of 0-ary relation) which may be thought of as falsity and truth, as those
used in the Codd’s relational-database algebra [3] respectively, while Truth ∈ D0 is
the concept (intension) of the tautology.
We define that D0 = {<>}, so that {f, t} = P(D0). Thus we have:
h = h−1 +
∑
i≥0 hi :
∑
i≥−1 Di −→ D−1 +
∑
i≥0 P(D
i),
where h−1 = id : D−1 → D−1 is identity, h0 : D0 → {f, t} assigns truth values
in {f, t}, to all propositions, and hi : Di → P(Di), i ≥ 1, assigns extension to all
concepts, where P is the powerset operator. Thus, intensions can be seen as names of
abstract or concrete entities, while extensions correspond to various rules that these en-
tities play in different worlds.
Remark: (Tarski’s constraint) This semantics has to preserve Tarski’s semantics of the
FOL, that is, for any formula φ ∈ Ł with the tuple of free variables (x1, ..., xk), any
assignment g ∈ DV , and every h ∈ E it has to be satisfied that:
(T) h(I(φ/g)) = t iff (g(x1), ..., g(xk)) ∈ h(I(φ)).

Thus, intensional FOL has the simple Tarski first-order semantics, with a decidable
unification problem, but we need also the actual world mapping which maps any inten-
sional entity to its actual world extension. In what follows we will identify a possible
world by a particular mapping which assigns to intensional entities their extensions in
such possible world. That is direct bridge between intensional FOL and possible worlds
representation [4,5,6,7,8,9], where intension of a proposition is a function from possi-
ble worlds W to truth-values, and properties and functions from W to sets of possible
(usually not-actual) objects.
Here E denotes the set of possible extensionalization functions that satisfy the con-
straint (T); they can be considered as possible worlds (as in Montague’s intensional
semantics for natural language [6,8]), as demonstrated in [10,11], given by the bijection
is :W ≃ E .
Now we are able to define formally this intensional semantics [9]:
Definition 2. TWO-STEP INTENSIONAL SEMANTICS:
Let R =
⋃
k∈N P(D
k) =
∑
k∈N P(D
k) be the set of all k-ary relations, where k ∈
N = {0, 1, 2, ...}. Notice that {f, t} = P(D0) ∈ R, that is, the truth values are exten-
sions in R.
The intensional semantics of the logic language with the set of formulae Ł can be rep-
resented by the mapping
Ł −→I D =⇒w∈W R,
where −→I is a fixed intensional interpretation I : Ł → D and =⇒w∈W is the set
of all extensionalization functions h = is(w) : D → R in E , where is : W → E is the
mapping from the set of possible worlds to the set of extensionalization functions.
We define the mapping In : Łop → RW , where Łop is the subset of formulae with free
variables (virtual predicates), such that for any virtual predicate φ(x1, ..., xk) ∈ Łop
the mapping In(φ(x1, ..., xk)) :W → R is the Montague’s meaning (i.e., intension) of
this virtual predicate [4,5,6,7,8], that is, the mapping which returns with the extension
of this (virtual) predicate in every possible world in W .
We adopted this two-step intensional semantics, instead of well known Montague’s se-
mantics (which lies in the construction of a compositional and recursive semantics that
covers both intension and extension) because of a number of its weakness.
Example: Let us consider the following two past participles: ’bought’ and ’sold’(with
unary predicates p11(x), ’x has been bought’, and p12(x),’x has been sold’). These two
different concepts in the Montague’s semantics would have not only the same extension
but also their intension, from the fact that their extensions are identical in every possible
world.
Within the two-steps formalism we can avoid this problem by assigning two different
concepts (meanings) u = I(p11(x)) and v = I(p12(x)) in ∈ D1. Notice that the same
problem we have in the Montague’s semantics for two sentences with different mean-
ings, which bear the same truth value across all possible worlds: in the Montague’s
semantics they will be forced to the same meaning.

Another relevant question w.r.t. this two-step interpretations of an intensional seman-
tics is how in it is managed the extensional identity relation .= (binary predicate of the
identity) of the FOL. Here this extensional identity relation is mapped into the binary
concept Id = I( .= (x, y)) ∈ D2, such that (∀w ∈ W)(is(w)(Id) = R=), where.
= (x, y) (i.e., p21(x, y)) denotes an atom of the FOL of the binary predicate for identity
in FOL, usually written by FOL formula x .= y (here we prefer to distinguish this for-
mal symbol .= ∈ P of the built-in identity binary predicate letter in the FOL from the
standard mathematical symbol ’=’ used in all mathematical definitions in this paper).
In what follows we will use the function f<> : R → R, such that for any R ∈ R,
f<>(R) = {<>} if R 6= ∅; ∅ otherwise. Let us define the following set of algebraic
operators for relations in R:
1. binary operator ⊲⊳S: R × R → R, such that for any two relations R1, R2 ∈ R ,
the R1 ⊲⊳S R2 is equal to the relation obtained by natural join of these two re-
lations if S is a non empty set of pairs of joined columns of respective rela-
tions (where the first argument is the column index of the relation R1 while the
second argument is the column index of the joined column of the relation R2);
otherwise it is equal to the cartesian product R1 × R2. For example, the logic
formula φ(xi, xj , xk, xl, xm) ∧ ψ(xl, yi, xj , yj) will be traduced by the algebraic
expression R1 ⊲⊳S R2 where R1 ∈ P(D5), R2 ∈ P(D4) are the extensions
for a given Tarski’s interpretation of the virtual predicate φ, ψ relatively, so that
S = {(4, 1), (2, 3)} and the resulting relation will have the following ordering of
attributes: (xi, xj , xk, xl, xm, yi, yj).
2. unary operator ∼: R → R, such that for any k-ary (with k ≥ 0) relation R ∈
P(Dk) ⊂ R we have that ∼ (R) = Dk\R ∈ Dk, where ’\’ is the substraction of
relations. For example, the logic formula ¬φ(xi, xj , xk, xl, xm) will be traduced
by the algebraic expression D5\R where R is the extensions for a given Tarski’s
interpretation of the virtual predicate φ.
3. unary operator π−m : R → R, such that for any k-ary (with k ≥ 0) relation
R ∈ P(Dk) ⊂ R we have that π−m(R) is equal to the relation obtained by
elimination of the m-th column of the relation R if 1 ≤ m ≤ k and k ≥ 2; equal
to f<>(R) ifm = k = 1; otherwise it is equal to R. For example, the logic
formula (∃xk)φ(xi, xj , xk, xl, xm) will be traduced by the algebraic expression
π−3(R) where R is the extensions for a given Tarski’s interpretation of the virtual
predicate φ and the resulting relation will have the following ordering of attributes:
(xi, xj , xl, xm).
Notice that the ordering of attributes of resulting relations corresponds to the method
used for generating the ordering of variables in the tuples of free variables adopted for
virtual predicates.
Analogously to Boolean algebras which are extensional models of propositional logic,
we introduce an intensional algebra for this intensional FOL as follows.
Definition 3. Intensional algebra for the intensional FOL in Definition 1 is a structure
Aint = (D, f, t, Id, T ruth, {conjS}S∈P(N2), neg,
{existsn}n∈N), with binary operations conjS : DI ×DI → DI , unary operation
neg : DI → DI , unary operations existsn : DI → DI , such that for any extension-
alization function h ∈ E , and u ∈ Dk, v ∈ Dj , k, j ≥ 0,
1. h(Id) = R= and h(Truth) = {<>}.
2. h(conjS(u, v)) = h(u) ⊲⊳S h(v), where ⊲⊳S is the natural join operation defined
above and conjS(u, v) ∈ Dm where m = k + j − |S| if for every pair (i1, i2) ∈ S it
holds that 1 ≤ i1 ≤ k, 1 ≤ i2 ≤ j (otherwise conjS(u, v) ∈ Dk+j ).
3. h(neg(u)) = ∼ (h(u)) = Dk\(h(u)), where ∼ is the operation defined above and
neg(u) ∈ Dk.
4. h(existsn(u)) = π−n(h(u)), where π−n is the operation defined above and
existsn(u) ∈ Dk−1 if 1 ≤ n ≤ k (otherwise existsn is the identity function).
Notice that for u ∈ D0, h(neg(u)) = ∼ (h(u)) = D0\(h(u)) = {<>}\(h(u)) ∈
{f, t}.
We define a derived operation union : (P(Di)\∅) → Di, i ≥ 0, such that, for any
B = {u1, ..., un} ∈ P(Di) we have that union({u1, ..., un}) =def u1 if n = 1;
neg(conjS(neg(u1), conjS(..., neg(un))...), where S = {(l, l) | 1 ≤ l ≤ i}, other-
wise. Than we obtain that for n ≥ 2:
h(union(B) = h(neg(conjS(neg(u1), conjS(..., neg(un))...)
= Di\((Di\h(u1) ⊲⊳S ... ⊲⊳S (Di\h(un))
= Di\((Di\h(u1)
⋂
...
⋂
(Di\h(un))
=
⋃
{h(uj) | 1 ≤ j ≤ n} =
⋃
{h(u) | u ∈ B}.
Intensional interpretation I : Ł → D satisfies the following homomorphic extension:
1. The logic formula φ(xi, xj , xk, xl, xm) ∧ ψ(xl, yi, xj , yj) will be intensionally in-
terpreted by the conceptu1 ∈ D7, obtained by the algebraic expression conjS(u, v)
where u = I(φ(xi, xj , xk, xl, xm)) ∈ D5, v = I(ψ(xl, yi, xj , yj)) ∈ D4 are the
concepts of the virtual predicates φ, ψ, relatively, and S = {(4, 1), (2, 3)}. Con-
sequently, we have that for any two formulae φ, ψ ∈ Ł and a particular opera-
tor conjS uniquely determined by tuples of free variables in these two formulae,
I(φ ∧ ψ) = conjS(I(φ), I(ψ)).
2. The logic formula ¬φ(xi, xj , xk, xl, xm) will be intensionally interpreted by the
concept u1 ∈ D5, obtained by the algebraic expression neg(u) where u = I(φ(xi,
xj , xk, xl, xm)) ∈ D5 is the concept of the virtual predicate φ. Consequently, we
have that for any formula φ ∈ Ł, I(¬φ) = neg(I(φ)).
3. The logic formula (∃xk)φ(xi, xj , xk, xl, xm) will be intensionally interpreted by
the concept u1 ∈ D4, obtained by the algebraic expression exists3(u) where
u = I(φ(xi, xj , xk, xl, xm)) ∈ D5 is the concept of the virtual predicate φ. Con-
sequently, we have that for any formula φ ∈ Ł and a particular operator existsn
uniquely determined by the position of the existentially quantified variable in the
tuple of free variables in φ (otherwise n = 0 if this quantified variable is not a free
variable in φ), I((∃x)φ) = existsn(I(φ)).
Once one has found a method for specifying the interpretations of singular terms of Ł
(take in consideration the particularity of abstracted terms), the Tarski-style definitions
of truth and validity for Ł may be given in the customary way. What is being south
specifically is a method for characterizing the intensional interpretations of singular
terms of Ł in such a way that a given singular abstracted term ⋖φ⋗βα will denote an
appropriate property, relation, or proposition, depending on the value of m = |α|. Thus,
the mapping of intensional abstracts (terms) into D we will define differently from that
given in the version of Bealer [12], as follows:
Definition 4. An intensional interpretation I can be extended to abstracted terms as
follows: for any abstracted term ⋖φ⋗βα we define that,
I(⋖φ⋗βα) = union({I(φ[β/g(β)]) | g ∈ D
β}),
where β denotes the set of elements in the list β, and the assignments inDβ are limited
only to the variables in β.
Remark: Here we can make the question if there is a sense to extend the interpretation
also to (abstracted) terms, because in Tarski’s interpretation of FOL we do not have any
interpretation for terms, but only the assignments for terms, as we defined previously
by the mapping g∗ : T → D. The answer is positive, because the abstraction symbol
⋖ ⋗βα can be considered as a kind of the unary built-in functional symbol of intensional
FOL, so that we can apply the Tarskian interpretation to this functional symbol into the
fixed mapping I(⋖ ⋗βα) : Ł → D, so that for any φ ∈ Ł we have that I(⋖φ⋗βα)
is equal to the application of this function to the value φ, that is, to I(⋖ ⋗βα)(φ). In
such an approach we would introduce also the typed variable X for the formulae in
Ł, so that the Tarskian assignment for this functional symbol with variable X , with
g(X) = φ ∈ Ł, can be given by:
g∗(⋖ ⋗βα (X)) = I(⋖ ⋗
β
α)(g(X)) = I(⋖ ⋗
β
α)(φ)
= <>∈ D−1, if α
⋃
β is not equal to the set of free variables in φ;
= union({I(φ[β/g′(β)]) | g′ ∈ Dβ}) ∈ D|α|, otherwise.

Notice than if β = ∅ is the empty list, then I(⋖φ⋗βα) = I(φ). Consequently, the deno-
tation of ⋖φ⋗ is equal to the meaning of a proposition φ, that is, I(⋖φ⋗) = I(φ) ∈
D0. In the case when φ is an atom pmi (x1, .., xm) then I(⋖pmi (x1, .., xm)⋗x1,..,xm) =
I(pmi (x1, .., xm)) ∈ Dm, while
I(⋖pmi (x1, .., xm)⋗
x1,..,xm) = union({I(pmi (g(x1), .., g(xm))) | g ∈ D
{x1,..,xm}}) ∈
D0, with h(I(⋖pmi (x1, .., xm)⋗x1,..,xm)) = h(I((∃x1)...(∃xm)pmi (x1, .., xm))) ∈
{f, t}.
For example,
h(I(⋖p1i (x1) ∧ ¬p
1
i (x1)⋗
x1)) = h(I((∃x1)(⋖p1i (x1) ∧ ¬p
1
i (x1)⋗
x1))) = f .
The interpretation of a more complex abstract ⋖φ⋗βα is defined in terms of the in-
terpretations of the relevant syntactically simpler expressions, because the interpreta-
tion of more complex formulae is defined in terms of the interpretation of the rele-
vant syntactically simpler formulae, based on the intensional algebra above. For ex-
ample, I(p1i (x) ∧ p1k(x)) = conj{(1,1)}(I(p1i (x)), I(p1k(x))), I(¬φ) = neg(I(φ)),
I(∃xi)φ(xi, xj , xi, xk) = exists3(I(φ)).
Consequently, based on the intensional algebra in Definition 3 and on intensional in-
terpretations of abstracted term in Definition 4, it holds that the interpretation of any
formula in Ł (and any abstracted term) will be reduced to an algebraic expression over
interpretation of primitive atoms in Ł. This obtained expression is finite for any finite
formula (or abstracted term), and represents the meaning of such finite formula (or
abstracted term).
The extension of abstracted terms satisfy the following property:
Proposition 1 For any abstracted term ⋖φ⋗βα with |α| ≥ 1 we have that
h(I(⋖φ⋗βα)) = π−β(h(I(φ))),
where π−(y1,...,yk) = π−y1 ◦ ... ◦ π−y1 , ◦ is the sequential composition of functions),
and π−∅ is an identity.
Proof: Let x be a tuple of all free variables in φ, so that x = α
⋃
β, α = (x1, ..., xk),
then we have that h(I(⋖φ⋗βα)) =
= h(union({I(φ[β/g(β)]) | g ∈ Dβ})), from Def. 4
=
⋃
{h(I(φ[β/g(β)])) | g ∈ Dβ}
=
⋃
{{(g1(x1), ..., g1(xk)) | g1 ∈ Dα and h(I(φ[β/g(β)][α/g1(α)])) = t} | g ∈ Dβ}
= {g1(α) | g1 ∈ D
α
⋃
β and h(I(φ/g1)) = t}
= π−β({g1(x) | g1 ∈ Dx and h(I(φ/g1)) = t})
= π−β({g1(x) | g1 ∈ Dx and g1(x) ∈ h(I(φ))}), by (T)
= π−β(h(I(φ))).

We can connect E with a possible-world semantics. Such a correspondence is a natural
identification of intensional logics with modal Kripke based logics.
Definition 5. (Model): A model for intensional FOL with fixed intensional interpreta-
tion I , which express the two-step intensional semantics in Definition 2, is the Kripke
structure Mint = (W ,D, V ), where W = {is−1(h) | h ∈ E}, a mapping V :
W × P →
⋃
n<ω{t, f}
Dn
, with P a set of predicate symbols of the language, such
that for any world w = is−1(h) ∈ W , pni ∈ P , and (u1, ..., un) ∈ Dn it holds
that V (w, pni )(u1, ..., un) = h(I(pni (u1, ..., un))). The satisfaction relation |=w,g for a
given w ∈ W and assignment g ∈ DV is defined as follows:
1. M |=w,g pki (x1, ..., xk) iff V (w, pki )(g(x1), ..., g(xk)) = t,
2. M |=w,g ϕ ∧ φ iff M |=w,g ϕ and M |=w,g φ,
3. M |=w,g ¬ϕ iff notM |=w,g ϕ,
4. M |=w,g (∃x)φ iff
4.1. M |=w,g φ, if x is not a free variable in φ;
4.2. exists u ∈ D such that M |=w,g φ[x/u], if x is a free variable in φ.
It is easy to show that the satisfaction relation |= for this Kripke semantics in a world
w = is−1(h) is defined by, M |=w,g φ iff h(I(φ/g)) = t.
We can enrich this intensional FOL by another modal operators, as for example the
”necessity” universal operator ✷ with an accessibility relation R = W ×W , obtain-
ing the S5 Kripke structure Mint = (W ,R,D, V ), in order to be able to define the
following equivalences between the abstracted terms without free variables⋖φ⋗β1α /g
and ⋖ψ ⋗β2α /g, where all free variables (not in α) are instantiated by g ∈ DV (here
A ≡ B denotes the formula (A⇒ B) ∧ (B ⇒ A)):
– (Strong) intensional equivalence (or equality) ”≍” is defined by:
⋖φ⋗β1α /g ≍ ⋖ψ ⋗
β2
α /g iff ✷(φ[β1/g(β1)] ≡ ψ[β2/g(β2)]),
with M |=w,g′ ✷ϕ iff for all w′ ∈ W , (w,w′) ∈ R implies M |=w′,g′ ϕ.
From Example 1 we have that ⋖p11(x)⋗x ≍ ⋖p12(x)⋗x, that is ’x has been
bought’ and ’x has been sold’ are intensionally equivalent, but they have not the
same meaning (the concept I(p11(x)) ∈ D1 is different from I(p12(x)) ∈ D1).
– Weak intensional equivalence ”≈” is defined by:
⋖φ⋗β1α /g ≈ ⋖ψ ⋗
β2
α /g iff ♦φ[β1/g(β1)] ≡ ♦ψ[β2/g(β2)].
The symbol♦ = ¬✷¬ is the correspondent existential modal operator.
This weak equivalence is used for P2P database integration in a number of papers
[13,14,15,16,17,18,10].
Notice that we do not use the intensional equality in our language, thus we do not need
the correspondent operator in intensional algebra Aint for the logic ”necessity” modal
operator✷.
This semantics is equivalent to the algebraic semantics for Ł in [2] for the case of the
conception where intensional entities are considered to be equal if and only if they are
necessarily equivalent. Intensional equality is much stronger that the standard exten-
sional equality in the actual world, just because requires the extensional equality in
all possible worlds, in fact, if ⋖φ ⋗β1α /g ≍ ⋖ψ ⋗β1α /g then h(I(⋖A ⋗β1α /g)) =
h(I(⋖ψ ⋗β2α /g)) for all extensionalization functions h ∈ E (that is possible worlds
is−1(h) ∈ W˜).
It is easy to verify that the intensional equality means that in every possible world
w ∈ W˜ the intensional entities u1 and u2 have the same extensions.
Let the logic modal formula ✷φ[β1/g(β1)], where the assignment g is applied only
to free variables in β1 of a formula φ not in the list of variables in α = (x1, ..., xn),
n ≥ 1, represents a n-ary intensional concept such that I(φ[β1/g(β1)]) ∈ Dn and
I(φ[β1/g(β1)]) = I(⋖φ ⋗
β1
α /g) ∈ Dn. Then the extension of this n-ary concept is
equal to (here the mapping necess : Di → Di for each i ≥ 0 is a new operation of the
intensional algebra Aint in Definition 3):
h(I(✷φ[β1/g(β1)]) = h(necess(I(φ[β1/g(β1)]))) =
= {(g′(x1), ..., g′(xn)) | M |=w,g′ φ[β1/g(β1)] and g′ ∈ DV}
= {(g′(x1), ..., g′(xn)) | g′ ∈ DV and ∀w1((w,w1) ∈ R impliesM |=w1,g′ φ[β1/g(β1)]) }
=
⋂
h1∈ E
h1(I(φ[β1/g(β1)])).
While,
h(I(♦φ[β1/g(β1)]) = h(I(¬✷¬φ[β1/g(β1)])
= h(neg(necess(I(¬φ[β1/g(β1)]))))
= Dn\h(necess(I(¬φ[β1/g(β1)])))
= Dn\(
⋂
h1∈ E
h1(I(¬φ[β1/g(β1)])))
= Dn\(
⋂
h1∈ E
h1(neg(I(φ[β1/g(β1)]))))
= Dn\(
⋂
h1∈ E
Dn\h1(I(φ[β1/g(β1)])))
=
⋃
h1∈ E
h1(I(φ[β1/g(β1)])).
Consequently, the concepts ✷φ[β1/g(β1)] and ♦φ[β1/g(β1)] are the built-in (or rigid)
concept as well, whose extensions does not depend on possible worlds.
Thus, two concepts are intensionally equal, that is, ⋖φ ⋗β1α /g ≍ ⋖ψ ⋗β2α /g, iff
h(I(φ[β1/g(β1)])) = h(I(ψ[β2/g(β2)])) for every h.
Moreover, two concepts are weakly equivalent, that is, ⋖φ ⋗β1α /g ≈ ⋖ψ ⋗β2α /g, iff
h(I(♦φ[β1/g(β1)])) = h(I(♦ψ[β2/g(β2)])).
3 Application to the intensional FOL without abstraction operator
In the case for the intensional FOL defined in Def. 1, without the Bealer’s intensional
abstraction operator⋖⋗, we obtain the syntax of the standard FOL but with intensional
semantics as presented in [9].
Such a FOL has a well known Tarski’s interpretation, defined as follows:
– An interpretation (Tarski) IT consists in a non empty domain D and a mapping
that assigns to any predicate letter pki ∈ P a relation R = IT (pki ) ⊆ Dk, to any
functional letter fki ∈ F a function IT (fki ) : Dk → D, or, equivalently, its graph
relation R = IT (fki ) ⊆ Dk+1 where the k+1-th column is the resulting function’s
value, and to each individual constant c ∈ F one given element IT (c) ∈ D.
Consequently, from the intensional point of view, an interpretation of Tarski is a
possible world in the Montague’s intensional semantics, that is w = IT ∈ W . The
corespondent extensionalization function if h = is(w) = is(IT ).
We define the satisfaction for the logic formulae in Ł and a given assignment g :
V → D inductively, as follows:
If a formula φ is an atomic formula pki (t1, ..., tk), then this assignment g satisfies φ
iff (g∗(t1), ..., g∗(tk)) ∈ IT (pki ); g satisfies ¬φ iff it does not satisfy φ; g satisfies
φ∧ψ iff g satisfies φ and g satisfies ψ; g satisfies (∃xi)φ iff exists an assignment
g′ ∈ DV that may differ from g only for the variable xi ∈ V , and g′ satisfies φ.
A formula φ is true for a given interpretation IT iff φ is satisfied by every
assignment g ∈ DV . A formula φ is valid (i.e., tautology) iff φ is true for
every Tarksi’s interpretation IT ∈ IT . An interpretation IT is a model of a set of
formulae Γ iff every formula φ ∈ Γ is true in this interpretation. We denote by
FOL(Γ ) the FOL with a set of assumptions Γ , and by IT (Γ ) the subset of Tarski’s
interpretations that are models of Γ , with IT (∅) = IT . A formula φ is said to be a
logical consequence of Γ , denoted by Γ  φ, iff φ is true in all interpretations in
IT (Γ ). Thus,  φ iff φ is a tautology.
The basic set of axioms of the FOL are that of the propositional logic with two
additional axioms: (A1) (∀x)(φ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ (φ ⇒ (∀x)ψ), (x does not occur in φ
and it is not bound in ψ), and (A2) (∀x)φ ⇒ φ[x/t], (neither x nor any variable in
t occurs bound in φ). For the FOL with identity, we need the proper axiom (A3)
x1
.
= x2 ⇒ (x1
.
= x3 ⇒ x2
.
= x3).
The inference rules are Modus Ponens and generalization (G) ”if φ is a theorem
and x is not bound in φ, then (∀x)φ is a theorem”.
The standard FOL is considered as an extensional logic because two open-sentences
with the same tuple of variables φ(x1, ..., xm) and ψ(x1, ..., xm) are equal iff they
have the same extension in a given interpretation IT , that is iff I∗T (φ(x1, ..., xm)) =
I∗T (ψ(x1, ..., xm)), where I∗T is the unique extension of IT to all formulae, as follows:
1. For a (closed) sentence φ/g we have that I∗T (φ/g) = t iff g satisfies φ, as recursively
defined above.
2. For an open-sentence φ with the tuple of free variables (x1, ..., xm) we have that
I∗T (φ(x1, ..., xm)) =def {(g(x1), ..., g(xm)) | g ∈ D
V and I∗T (φ/g) = t}.
It is easy to verify that for a formula φ with the tuple of free variables (x1, ..., xm),
I∗T (φ(x1, ..., xm)/g) = t iff (g(x1), ..., g(xm)) ∈ I∗T (φ(x1, ..., xm)).
This extensional equality of virtual predicates can be generalized to the extensional
equivalence when both predicates φ, ψ has the same set of free variables but their or-
dering in the tuples of free variables are not identical: such two virtual predicates are
equivalent if the extension of the first is equal to the proper permutation of columns of
the extension of the second virtual predicate. It is easy to verify that such an extensional
equivalence corresponds to the logical equivalence denoted by φ ≡ ψ.
This extensional equivalence between two relations R1, R2 ∈ R with the same arity
will be denoted by R1 ∼= R2, while the extensional identity will be denoted in the stan-
dard way by R1 = R2.
Let AFOL = (Ł,
.
=,⊤,∧,¬, ∃) be a free syntax algebra for ”First-order logic with
identity .=”, with the set Ł of first-order logic formulae, with ⊤ denoting the tautology
formula (the contradiction formula is denoted by ¬⊤), with the set of variables in V and
the domain of values in D . It is well known that we are able to make the extensional
algebraization of the FOL by using the cylindric algebras [19] that are the extension
of Boolean algebras with a set of binary operators for the FOL identity relations and
a set of unary algebraic operators (”projections”) for each case of FOL quantification
(∃x). In what follows we will make an analog extensional algebraization over R but by
interpretation of the logic conjunction∧ by a set of natural join operators over relations
introduced by Codd’s relational algebra [3,20] as a kind of a predicate calculus whose
interpretations are tied to the database.
Corollary 1 EXTENSIONAL FOL SEMANTICS:
Let us define the extensional relational algebra for the FOL by,
AR = (R, R=, {<>}, {⊲⊳S}S∈P(N2),∼, {π−n}n∈N),
where {<>} ∈ R is the algebraic value correspondent to the logic truth, and R= is
the binary relation for extensionally equal elements. We will use ’=’ for the extensional
identity for relations in R.
Then, for any Tarski’s interpretation IT its unique extension to all formulae I∗T : Ł → R
is also the homomorphism I∗T : AFOL → AR from the free syntax FOL algebra into
this extensional relational algebra.
Proof: In [9]

Consequently, we obtain the following Intensional/extensional FOL semantics [9]:
For any Tarski’s interpretation IT of the FOL, the following diagram of homomor-
phisms commutes,
Aint (concepts/meaning)
Frege/Russell
semantics
AFOL (syntax)
I∗T (Tarski
′s interpretation)
✲
I (
int
en
sio
na
l in
ter
pre
t.)
✲
AR (denotation)
h (extensionalization)✲
where h = is(w) where w = IT ∈ W is the explicit possible world (extensional
Tarski’s interpretation).
This homomorphic diagram formally express the fusion of Frege’s and Russell’s se-
mantics [21,22,23] of meaning and denotation of the FOL language, and renders math-
ematically correct the definition of what we call an ”intuitive notion of intensionality”,
in terms of which a language is intensional if denotation is distinguished from sense:
that is, if both a denotation and sense is ascribed to its expressions. This notion is sim-
ply adopted from Frege’s contribution (without its infinite sense-hierarchy, avoided by
Russell’s approach where there is only one meaning relation, one fundamental relation
between words and things, here represented by one fixed intensional interpretation I),
where the sense contains mode of presentation (here described algebraically as an alge-
bra of concepts (intensions)Aint, and where sense determines denotation for any given
extensionalization function h (correspondent to a given Traski’s interpretaion IT ). More
about the relationships between Frege’s and Russell’s theories of meaning may be found
in the Chapter 7, ”Extensionality and Meaning”, in [12].
As noted by Gottlob Frege and Rudolf Carnap (he uses terms Intension/extension in
the place of Frege’s terms sense/denotation [24]), the two logic formulae with the same
denotation (i.e., the same extension for a given Tarski’s interpretation IT ) need not have
the same sense (intension), thus such co-denotational expressions are not substitutable
in general.
In fact there is exactly one sense (meaning) of a given logic formula in Ł, defined by
the uniquely fixed intensional interpretation I , and a set of possible denotations (exten-
sions) each determined by a given Tarski’s interpretation of the FOL as follows from
Definition 2,
Ł −→I D =⇒h=is(IT )&IT∈ W=IT (Γ ) R.
Often ’intension’ has been used exclusively in connection with possible worlds seman-
tics, however, here we use (as many others; as Bealer for example) ’intension’ in a more
wide sense, that is as an algebraic expression in the intensional algebra of meanings
(concepts)Aint which represents the structural composition of more complex concepts
(meanings) from the given set of atomic meanings. Consequently, not only the denota-
tion (extension) is compositional, but also the meaning (intension) is compositional.
4 Conclusion
Semantics is the theory concerning the fundamental relations between words and things.
In Tarskian semantics of the FOL one defines what it takes for a sentence in a language
to be true relative to a model. This puts one in a position to define what it takes for
a sentence in a language to be valid. Tarskian semantics often proves quite useful in
logic. Despite this, Tarskian semantics neglects meaning, as if truth in language were
autonomous. Because of that the Tarskian theory of truth becomes inessential to the
semantics for more expressive logics, or more ’natural’ languages.
Both, Montague’s and Bealer’s approaches were useful for this investigation of the in-
tensional FOL with intensional abstraction operator, but the first is not adequate and ex-
plains why we adopted two-step intensional semantics (intensional interpretation with
the set of extensionalization functions).
At the end of this work we defined an extensional algebra for the FOL (different from
standard cylindric algebras), and the commutative homomorphic diagram that express
the generalization of the Tarskian theory of truth for the FOL into the Frege/Russell’s
theory of meaning.
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